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Summary
Congress has been considering expanding the barriers currently deployed along
the U.S. international land border.  Currently, the United States Border Patrol
(USBP) deploys fencing, which aims to impede the illegal entry of individuals, and
vehicle barriers, which aim to impede the illegal entry of vehicles (but not
individuals) along the border.  The USBP first began erecting barriers in 1990 to
deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in its San Diego sector.  The ensuing 14
mile-long San Diego “primary fence” formed part of the USBP’s “Prevention
Through Deterrence” strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by
placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order
to deter would-be migrants from entering the country.  In 1996, Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which, among other
things, explicitly gave the Attorney General (now the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security) broad authority to construct barriers along the border and
authorized the construction of a secondary layer of fencing to buttress the completed
14 mile primary fence.  Construction of the secondary fence stalled due to
environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission.   In 2005,
Congress passed the REAL ID Act which authorized the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements in order to expedite the
construction of border barriers.  DHS has since announced it will use this waiver
authority to complete the San Diego fence and is acquiring the necessary land.
While the San Diego fence, combined with an increase in agents and other
resources in the USBP’s San Diego sector, has proven effective in reducing the
number of apprehensions made in that sector, there is considerable evidence that the
flow of illegal immigration has adapted to this enforcement posture and has shifted
to the more remote areas of the Arizona desert.  Over the twelve year period between
1992 and 2004, overall apprehensions in the San Diego sector declined by 76% while
apprehensions in the Yuma sector increased by 591%.  Nationally, the USBP made
1.2 million apprehensions in 1992 and again in 2004, suggesting that the increased
enforcement in San Diego sector has had little impact on overall apprehensions.
In addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary
vehicle barriers to the border.  Temporary vehicle barriers are typically chained
together and can be moved to different locations at the USBP’s discretion.
Permanent vehicle barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to remain in
one location.  The USBP is currently erecting a 150 mile stretch of vehicle barriers,
in conjunction with the National Park Service, near Yuma, Arizona.
A number of policy issues concerning border barriers generally and fencing
specifically may be of interest to Congress, including, but not limited to: their
effectiveness; their costs versus their benefits; their location; their design; and their
potential diplomatic ramifications.  Prominent bills include House-passed H.R. 4437
and H.R. 6061, and Senate-passed S. 2611, and H.R. 5631.  
This report will be updated periodically as needed.
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Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S.
International Border
Background
Within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) is charged with securing our
nation’s land and maritime borders between official ports of entry (POE) to deter and
interdict terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and aliens attempting to enter the
country unlawfully.  In order to discharge its duties, the USBP deploys personnel,
technology, and tactical infrastructure such as vehicle barriers and fencing.  Fencing
is erected on the border to impede the illegal entry of unauthorized aliens, while
vehicle barriers are designed to impede the entry of vehicles but do not impede the
entry of individuals.  This report will analyze the barriers that are currently being
constructed and maintained along the border by the USBP, including historical and
future cost estimates and the policy issues involved.  Because the current debate has
largely focused on the deployment of fencing to the border, this report will focus on
the policy issues surrounding the construction of border fencing.  However,
information concerning the kinds of vehicle barriers being deployed at the border will
be provided where available.
Using the broad powers granted to the Attorney General (AG) to control and
guard the U.S. border,1 the USBP began erecting a barrier known as the “primary
fence” directly on the border in 1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in
its San Diego sector.2  The San Diego fence formed part of the USBP’s “Prevention
Through Deterrence” strategy,3 which called for reducing unauthorized migration by
placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order
to deter would-be migrants from entering the country.  The San Diego primary fence
was completed in 1993, covering the first 14 miles of the border from the Pacific
Ocean.  The fence was constructed of 10-foot-high welded steel army surplus landing
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4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Control — Revised Strategy Is Showing
Some Positive Results, GAO/GGD-95-30, Jan. 31, 1995.  Referred to hereafter as GAO
Report 95-30.
5 See P.L. 104-208, Div. C. IIRIRA was passed as part of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997.
6 P.L. 109-13.
7 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Operation Gatekeeper: An
Investigation Into Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct, July, 1998, available at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9807/gkp01.htm#P160_18689]
mats4 with the assistance of the Corps of Engineers and the California National
Guard.  In addition to the 14 miles of primary fencing erected in its San Diego sector,
the USBP maintains stretches of primary fencing in several other sectors along the
southwest border, including Yuma, Tucson, El Centro, and El Paso.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) which, among other things, explicitly gave the Attorney
General broad authority to construct barriers along the border and authorized the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to construct a secondary layer of
fencing to buttress the completed 14 mile primary fence.5  Construction of the
secondary fence stalled after 9.5 miles had been completed due to environmental
concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission (CCC).   In 2005, Congress
passed the REAL ID Act which, among other things, authorized the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements in order to
expedite the construction of border barriers.6  
In addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary
vehicle barriers at the border.  Vehicle barriers are meant to stop the entry of
vehicles, but not people, into the United States.  Temporary vehicle barriers are
typically chained together and can be moved to different locations at the USBP’s
discretion.  Permanent vehicle barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to
remain in one location.  The USBP is currently erecting a 150 mile stretch of vehicle
barriers in conjunction with the National Park Service near Yuma, Arizona.
The San Diego Border Primary Fence
The USBP’s San Diego sector extends along the first 66 miles from the Pacific
Ocean of the international border with Mexico, and covers approximately 7,000
square miles of territory.   Located north of Tijuana and Tecate, Mexican cities with
a combined population of over two million people, the sector features no natural
barriers to entry by unauthorized migrants and smugglers.7  As a result of this
geographical reality and in response to the large numbers of unauthorized aliens
crossing the border in the area, in 1990 the USBP began erecting a physical barrier
to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling.  The ensuing “primary” fence covered the
CRS-3
8 GAO Report 95-30.
9 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Operation Gatekeeper: An
Investigation Into Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct, July, 1998, available at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9807/index.htm].  Hereafter referred to as DOJ-OIG
Gatekeeper Report.
10 DOJ-OIG Gatekeeper Report.
11 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Operation
Gatekeeper Fact Sheet,” July 14, 1998.
first 14 miles of the border, starting from the Pacific Ocean, and was constructed of
10 foot high welded steel.8  
Operation Gatekeeper
The primary fence, by itself, did not have a discernible impact on the influx of
unauthorized aliens coming across the border in San Diego.  As a result of this,
Operation Gatekeeper was officially announced in the San Diego sector on October
1, 1994.  The chief elements of the operation were large increases in the overall
manpower of the sector, and the deployment of USBP personnel directly along the
border to deter illegal entry.  The strategic plan called for three tiers of agent
deployment.  The first tier of agents was deployed to fixed positions on the border.
The agents in this first tier were charged with preventing illegal entry, apprehending
those who attempted to enter, and generally observing the border.  A second tier of
agents was deployed north of the border in the corridors that were heavily used by
illegal aliens.  The second tier of agents had more freedom of movement than the first
tier and were charged with containing and apprehending those aliens who made it
past the first tier.  The third tier of agents were typically assigned to man vehicle
checkpoints further inland to apprehend the traffic that eluded the first two tiers.   As
the Department of Justice Inspector General report notes, “given Gatekeeper’s
deterrence emphasis, many agents were assigned to first-tier, fixed positions along
the border. These agents were instructed to remain in their assigned positions rather
than chase alien traffic passing through adjacent areas. Prior to Gatekeeper, such
stationary positions were relatively rare.”9  
Operation Gatekeeper resulted in significant increases in the manpower and
other resources  deployed to San Diego sector.  Agents received additional night
vision goggles, portable radios, and four-wheel drive vehicles, and light towers and
seismic sensors were deployed.10  According to the former INS, between October
1994 and June of 1998, San Diego sector saw the following increases in resources:
! USBP agent manpower increased by 150%;
! Seismic sensors deployed increased by 171%;
! Vehicle fleet increased by 152%. 
! Infrared night-vision goggles increased from 12 to 49;
! Permanent lighting increased from 1 mile to 6 miles, and 100
portable lighting platforms were deployed;
! Helicopter fleet increased from 6 to 10.11
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12 DOJ-OIG Gatekeeper Report.
13 See California Coastal Commission, W 13a Staff Report and Recommendation on
Consistency Determination, CD-063-03, Oct. 2003, at 14-16 (stating that construction of the
primary fence significantly assisted the USBP’s efforts in deterring smuggling attempts via
drive-throughs using automobiles and motorcycles).   (Hereafter CCC Staff Report.)
14 GAO 95-30, p. 13.  
15 GAO 95-30, p. 13.  
16 Peter Andreas, “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era,”
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 113, no. 4, winter 1998-1999, p. 595.
As a result of the increase in resources and the new strategy that were the main
components of Operation Gatekeeper, the USBP estimated in 1998 that  the entire 66
miles of border patrolled by the San Diego sector’s agents could be brought under
control in five years.12
Sandia National Laboratory Study
According to CBP, the primary fence, in combination with various USBP
enforcement initiatives along the San Diego border region (i.e., Operation
Gatekeeper), proved to be successful but fiscally and environmentally costly.13  For
example, as unauthorized aliens and smugglers breached the primary fence and
attempted to evade detection, USBP agents were often forced to pursue the suspects
through environmentally sensitive areas.  It soon became apparent to immigration
officials and lawmakers that the USBP needed, among other things, a “rigid”
enforcement system that could integrate infrastructure (i.e., a multi-tiered fence and
roads), manpower, and new technologies to further control the border region.  
The concept of a three-tiered fence system was first recommended by a 1993
Sandia Laboratory study commissioned by the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).  According to the Sandia study, the use of multiple
barriers in urban areas would increase the USBP’s ability to discourage a significant
number of illegal border crossers, to detect intruders early and delay them as long as
possible, and to channel a reduced number of illegal border crossers to geographic
locations where the USBP was better prepared to deal with them.14  The Sandia study
further noted that segments of the border could not be controlled at the immediate
border due to the ruggedness of the terrain, and recommended the use of highway
checkpoints in those areas to contain aliens after they had entered the country
illegally.15  The study concluded that aliens attempting to enter the United States from
Mexico had shown remarkable resiliency in bypassing or destroying obstacles in their
path, including the existing primary fence, and postulated that “[a] three-fence barrier
system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights will provide the
necessary discouragement.”16  
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19 Although the law still cites to the Attorney General, the authorities granted by this section
now appear to rest with the Secretary of DHS.  See The Homeland Security Act of 2002,
P.L. 104-208, §§102(a), 441, 1512(d) and 1517 (references to the Attorney General or
Commissioner in statute and regulations are deemed to refer to the Secretary).
20 See CCC, Staff Report, at 7 nt. 2 and p. 23 nt. 4.  
Original Congressional Border Barrier Legislation
As previously mentioned, the INS constructed the primary fencing in San Diego
using the broad authority granted to the AG in order to guard and control the U.S.
border by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).17  In 1996, Congress expressly
authorized the AG to construct barriers at the border for the first time in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).18  
Section 102 of IIRIRA — Improvement of Barriers 
at the Border
Section 102 of IIRIRA concerned the improvement and construction of barriers
at our international borders.  Section 102(a) appeared to give the AG19 broad
authority to install additional physical barriers and roads “in the vicinity of the United
States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United
States.”  The phrase vicinity of the United States border is not defined in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.) or in immigration
regulations.  The section also did not stipulate what specific characteristics would
designate an area as one of high illegal entry.
Section 102(b) mandated that the AG construct a barrier in the border area near
San Diego.  Specifically, §102(b) directed the AG to construct a three-tiered barrier
along the 14 miles of the international land border of the U.S., starting at the Pacific
Ocean and extending eastward.  Section 102(b) ensured that the AG will build a
barrier, pursuant to his broader authority in §102(a), near the San Diego area,
although there is some debate whether IIRIRA requires continuous triple fencing and
roads for the entire 14-mile corridor.20  Section 102(b) also provided authority for the
acquisition of necessary easements, required certain safety features be incorporated
into the design of the fence, and authorized a total appropriation not to exceed $12
million to carry out the section.
Section 102(c) waived the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 (16 U.S.C.
§§1531 et seq.)  and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42
U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.),  to the extent the AG determined necessary, in order to ensure
expeditious construction of the barriers authorized to be constructed under §102.  The
waiver authority in this provision appeared to apply both to barriers that may be
constructed in the vicinity of the border and to the barrier that was to be constructed
near the San Diego area. The INS (and CBP after 2003) reportedly never exercized




23 See CCC, Staff Report, at 5-7.  After California’s Coastal Management Plan was approved
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pursuant to the CZMA in 1977,
apparently all federal activities affecting coastal zone resources in California became subject
to the CCC’s regulatory purview.  
24 16 U.S.C. §1456(c).
and the ESA.  The INS published a Final Environmental Impact Study pursuant to
NEPA and received a non-jeopardy Biological Opinion from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service under the ESA.21  This waiver authority was expanded in the 109th
Congress by the REAL-ID Act, which will be discussed in greater detail
subsequently, and DHS has subsequently announced it will be implementing this
expanded waiver authority.
Section 102(d) also provided the AG with various land acquisition authority.
In 2002, Congress amended the U.S. Code to authorize the AG to use INS funds to
purchase land for enforcement fences and to construct the fences.22
The San Diego Sandia Fence
In 1996, construction began on the secondary fence that had been recommended
by the Sandia study with congressional approval.  The new fence was to parallel the
fourteen miles of primary fence already constructed on land patrolled by the Imperial
Beach Station of the San Diego sector, and included permanent lighting as well as an
access road in between the two layers of fencing.  Of the 14 miles of fencing
authorized to be constructed by IIRIRA, nine miles of the triple fence had been
completed by the end of FY2005.  Two sections, including the final three mile stretch
of fence that leads to the Pacific Ocean, have not been finished.  
The California Coastal Commission
In order to finish the fence, the USBP proposed to fill a deep canyon known as
“Smuggler’s Gulch” with over two million cubic yards of dirt.  The triple-fence
would then be extended across the filled gulch.  California’s Coastal Commission
(CCC), however, objected to and essentially halted the completion of the fence in
February 2004, because it determined that CBP had not demonstrated, among other
things, that the project was consistent “to the maximum extent practicable” with the
policies of the California Coastal Management Program — a state program approved
under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (16 U.S.C. §§1451-
1464).23  The CZMA requires federal agency activity within or outside the coastal
zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone to be
carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with
the policies of an approved state management program.24  If a federal court finds a
federal activity to be inconsistent with an approved state program and the Secretary
of DHS (Secretary) determines that compliance is unlikely to be achieved through
CRS-7
25 16 U.S.C. §1456(c)(1)(B).
26 For more information on the REAL ID Act, please refer to CRS Report RL32754,
Immigration: Analysis of the Major Provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, by Michael
John Garcia, Margaret Mikyung Lee, and Todd Tatelman.
27 One of the most analogous provisions CRS located appears to be, at least on its face, 43
U.S.C. §1652(c), which authorizes the waiver of all procedural requirements in law related
to the construction of the Trans-Alaska pipeline and limits judicial review to constitutional
claims.
mediation, the President may exempt from compliance the activity if the President
determines that the activity is in the “paramount interest of the United States.”25   
According to the CCC, CBP did not believe that it could make further
environmental concessions and still comply with IIRIRA.  The CCC held that
Congress did not specify a particular design in the IIRIRA, and that CBP failed to
present a convincing argument that the less environmentally damaging alternative
projects it rejected would have prevented compliance with the IIRIRA.  Specifically,
the CCC was concerned with the potential for significant adverse effects on:  (1) the
Tijuana River National Estuarine Research and Reserve; (2) state and federally listed
threatened and endangered species; (3) lands set aside for protection within
California’s Multiple Species Conservation Program; and, (4) other aspects of the
environment.  In response to the CCC’s findings, Congress expanded the waiver
authority in the REAL ID Act, described in more detail below, in order to allow DHS
to waive the CZMA, among other things.
The REAL ID Act
In the 109th Congress, H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005, contained language
requiring the Secretary of DHS to waive all laws necessary to ensure expeditious
construction of the security barriers.  H.R. 418 was passed by the House as a
stand-alone piece of legislation, but was also attached as an amendment to
House-passed H.R. 1268, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for
FY2005.  During conference, language was revised in H.R. 1268 to “authorize,”
instead of “require,” the Secretary of DHS to waive all “legal requirements,” instead
of “all laws.”  The conferees also added a new provision that would make such
waiver decisions effective upon publication in the Federal Register.  Language was
also added granting federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to review claims
alleging that the actions or decisions of the Secretary violate the U.S. Constitution,
and allowing district court rulings to be reviewed only by the U.S. Supreme Court.
H.R. 1268 was signed into law on May 11, 2005 (P.L. 109-13).26    
The waiver authority provided in §102 of the REAL ID Act appears to be a
broad grant of authority because, in part, it authorizes the waiver of all legal
requirements determined necessary by the Secretary for the expeditious construction
of authorized barriers and only allows judicial review for constitutional claims.27
Furthermore, these claims can only be appealed to the Supreme Court (i.e, there is
no intermediate appellate review), whose review is discretionary.  It is unclear what
a “legal requirement” may include, but the term could arguably be as limited as filing
requirements or be as broad as an entire law.  Moreover, because §102 of the REAL
CRS-8
28 Department of Homeland Security, “Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section 102
of the REAL ID Act of 2005,” 70 Federal Register 55622-02, September 22, 2005.
29 Interview with CBP Congressional Affairs, September 13, 2006.
30 If the same person is apprehended multiple times attempting to enter the country in one
year, each apprehension will be counted separately by the USBP in generating their
apprehension statistics.  This means that apprehension statistics may overstate the number
of aliens apprehended each year.
ID Act amends only the waiver provision of §102 of IIRIRA, the new waiver
authority appears to apply to all the barriers that may be constructed under IIRIRA
— i.e., both to barriers constructed in the vicinity of the border in areas of high illegal
entry and to the barrier that is to be constructed near the San Diego area.  
Current Status of the San Diego Triple Fence
  The military has now begun upgrading and rebuilding the San Diego border
fence.  The Senate-passed version of the FY2006 DHS Appropriations bill, H.R.
2360, includes $50 million for construction of the border fence in San Diego, and $50
million for border infrastructure, including fences and vehicle barriers, in Arizona.
On September 14, 2005, DHS announced it is applying its new waiver authority to
complete the San Diego fence.28  DHS is currently in the land acquisition phase of
the project, and construction had not started as of September 2006.29
The San Diego Fence and USBP Apprehensions
Apprehension statistics have long been used as a performance measure by the
USBP.  However, the number of apprehensions may be a misleading statistic for
several reasons, including the data’s focus on events rather than people30 and the fact
that there are no reliable estimates for how many aliens successfully evade capture.
This makes it difficult to establish a firm correlation between the number of
apprehensions in a given sector and the number of people attempting to enter through
that sector.  While caution should be taken when attempting to draw conclusions
about the efficacy of policy initiatives based solely on apprehensions statistics, they
remain the most reliable way to codify trends in illegal migration along the border.
The San Diego fence spans two border patrol stations within the San Diego
sector:  Imperial Beach station and Chula Vista station.  As previously noted, the
primary fence was constructed in those two stations beginning in FY1990; the
secondary fence was constructed beginning in FY1996.  Figure 1 shows the stark
decrease in apprehensions at the Imperial Beach station from fiscal year (FY) 1992
to FY2004.  The majority of the decrease occurred in the four year period from
FY1995 through FY1998 and coincided with Operation Gatekeeper, which as
previously noted combined the construction of fencing along the border with an
increase in agents and other resources deployed directly along the border.  For the
period from FY1998 to FY2004, apprehensions at the Imperial Beach station
averaged about 14,000 each year.
CRS-9
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Figure 2 shows the apprehensions at the Chula Vista station over the same
period of time.  The trend in apprehensions at Chula Vista is somewhat similar to
Imperial Beach, with overall apprehensions dropping significantly from FY1992 to
FY2002.  Apprehensions increased slightly from FY2002 to FY2004, but remain far
below their early 1990s levels.  Interestingly, the rate of decline in Chula Vista in the
mid-1990s lagged behind the rate of decline in Imperial Beach station during this
period.  This suggests that as enforcement ramped up in Imperial Beach station,
unauthorized migration shifted westward to Chula Vista.  From FY1992 to FY1998,
for example, apprehensions decreased by 92% in Imperial Beach, but only by 54%
in Chula Vista.  From FY1998 through FY2001, apprehensions leveled off in
Imperial Beach, averaging around 16,000 a year, but continued to decline at Chula
Vista, from 72,648 in FY1998 to 3,080 in FY2002.  Overall, the trend indicates the
following: as enforcement measures, in this case including fencing, were deployed
— first focusing on Imperial Beach, and later extending to Chula Vista — the flow
of unauthorized migration pushed eastward.  The drop in apprehensions occurred first



























Figure 1: Imperial Beach Station Apprehensions
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31 For more information on overall apprehension trends, please refer to CRS Report
RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by Blas Nuñez-Neto.
Source: CRS analysis of CBP data.
Figure 3 shows the aggregate apprehensions made at the other San Diego sector
stations, excluding Imperial Beach and Chula Vista.  Those stations are El Cajon,
Campo, San Clemente, Temecula, and Brown Field.  Figure 3 shows that at the time
apprehensions were beginning to decline in Imperial Beach (starting in FY1995) and
Chula Vista (starting in FY1996), apprehensions at other San Diego sector stations
almost doubled.  This suggests that as enforcement efforts increased in the two
westernmost stations, including the installation of fencing and the deployment of
additional agents, the flow of illegal migration pushed eastward to the other stations
in the San Diego sector.  While apprehensions declined in the non-fenced stations of
the San Diego sector from FY1997 to FY2001, the rate of decline was not as steep
as the rate of decline at the stations where fencing was deployed.  Overall, the decline
in apprehensions in the rest of the San Diego sector has lagged behind the decreases
in Imperial Beach and Chula Vista: from FY1992 to FY2004, apprehensions in the
other San Diego sector stations decreased by 42%, compared to decreases of 95% in
Imperial Beach and 94% in Chula Vista.  In FY2003 and FY2004, apprehensions
increased slightly in the rest of San Diego sector, possibly in response to the
increasing USBP focus on the Tucson sector in Arizona.31  It seems, then, that the
installation of border fencing, in combination with an increase in agent manpower



































Figure 2: Chula Vista Station Apprehensions
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the San Diego sector.  This in turn suggests that fewer unauthorized aliens are
attempting to cross the border in the San Diego sector as a result of the increased
enforcement measures, including fencing, manpower, and other resources, that were
deployed to that sector.
Source: CRS analysis of CBP data.
Figure 4 shows overall San Diego sector apprehensions, breaking out the
Imperial Beach and Chula Vista stations, and compares them to the apprehensions
made at the Tucson sector between FY1992 and FY2004.  The data used to create
this graph can be seen presented in table form in Appendix V.  Figure 4 shows that
in FY1992, Imperial Beach and Chula Vista accounted for 64% of all apprehensions
made in the San Diego sector; by FY2004 the two stations accounted for only 14%
of all apprehensions made in the sector. However, as apprehensions declined in
Imperial Beach and Chula Vista stations and San Diego sector as a whole over the
late 1990s and early 2000s, apprehensions in the Tucson sector in Arizona increased
significantly over this period.  Over the twelve year period between 1992 and 2004,
overall apprehensions in the San Diego sector declined by 76%.  However, as
apprehensions were decreasing in the San Diego sector, they were increasing in other
sectors further east.  This increase was most notable within the Tucson sector in
Arizona, where apprehensions increased six-fold (591%) between FY1992 and
FY2004.  As Figure 4 shows, overall apprehensions in the San Diego and Tucson
sectors combined have averaged roughly 620,000 yearly since FY1992, with the San
Diego sector accounting for the lion’s share during the early 1990s and the Tucson

































Figure 3: Apprehensions at San Diego Sector Stations, Excluding
Imperial Beach and Chula Vista
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32 CRS analysis of CBP data.
that the construction of the fence, combined with the increases in manpower in the
San Diego sector, changed the patterns of migration for unauthorized aliens
attempting to enter the country illegally from Mexico. 
Source: CRS analysis of CBP data.
As Figures 1-4 show, the increased deployment of agents, infrastructure,
technology, and other resources within the San Diego sector has resulted in a
significant decline in the number of apprehensions made in that sector.  Nationally,
apprehensions made by the USBP grew steadily through the late 1990s, only to
decline in the early 2000s.  However, in 1992 the USBP apprehended 1.2 million
unauthorized aliens; in 2004, the USBP also apprehended 1.2 million unauthorized
aliens.32 While the increased enforcement in the San Diego sector has resulted in a
shift in migration patterns for unauthorized aliens, it does not appear to have
decreased the overall number of apprehensions made each year by USBP agents.  As
previously noted, apprehensions statistics can be somewhat misleading, but they
nevertheless remain the best way to codify trends in unauthorized migration along the
border.  However, it is impossible to ascertain solely by looking at apprehensions


























Other San Diego Sector Stations
Figure 4: Apprehensions at San Diego Sector Stations and Tucson
Sector
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33 Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Budget Justifications for Fiscal Year
2007, pg.  CBP Construction 20.  Hereafter referred to as DHS FY2007 Justifications.
34 FY2006 is an exception.  Within the conference report, $35 million was identified for the
Southwest Border Fence and $35 million was identified for the construction of vehicle
barriers and other border infrastructure in Tucson sector.  H.Rept. 109-241.
because it is unclear how many individuals evade being captured by the USBP each
year.
Border Barrier Construction
The USBP has been constructing and maintaining barriers along the
international land border since 1991.  These barriers have historically been limited
to selected urban areas as part of the USBP’s overall strategy of rerouting illegal
migration away from urban areas towards geographically isolated areas where their
agents have a tactical advantage over border crossers.  Two main types of border
fencing have been constructed: primary fencing located directly on the border along
several urban areas; and Sandia fencing, also known as secondary or triple fencing,
in San Diego.  Additionally, the USBP has begun installing permanent vehicle
barriers in various segments of the border.  Vehicle barriers are designed to impede
the entry of vehicles while allowing individuals and animals to cross the border
freely.  As such, they have a lower environmental footprint than border fencing.
Border Fence Construction Process and Funding  
CBP currently constructs border fencing under a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with the ECSO (Engineering and Construction Support Office) of the US
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).  ECSO manages several components of the
construction process for CBP, including planning and acquisition of real estate;
drafting the environmental protection plan; designing the project and formulating the
engineering costs; overseeing the construction process; and enforcing the appropriate
warranties.  On most of the tactical infrastructure projects, National Guard units and
military units from the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Task Force North
provide the labor.  DOD uses these projects as part of their training regimen,
leveraging their ability to deploy tactical infrastructure and thereby providing zero
labor costs to CBP.33  The funding for land acquisition and fence materials comes out
of the CBP construction account within the DHS appropriation.  Specific funding for
fence construction is rarely identified in the conference reports, though it typically
has been identified within the DHS (and previously the former INS) Congressional
Budget Justifications.34  Table 1 shows the overall amount appropriated for the
USBP construction account, and the specific amounts identified for tactical
infrastructure within that account, since FY1996.  Appropriations for fencing and
other border barriers has increased markedly over the past five years, from $6 million
in FY2002 to $93 million in FY2006.  
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Table 1.  Border Patrol Tactical Infrastructure Appropriations
(millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year Construction Account(total)
Tactical Infrastructure
Construction












Sources: For FY2006-FY2007, the amounts appropriated for construction and tactical infrastructure
were identified from the FY2007 DHS Congressional Budget Justifications.  For FY2004-FY2005,
the amounts appropriated for construction and tactical infrastructure were identified from the FY2006
DHS Congressional Budget Justifications.  FY2003 construction and tactical infrastructure funding
was identified from the FY2005 DHS Congressional Budget Justifications.  FY1996-FY2002 tactical
infrastructure funding was identified in the FY2003 INS Congressional Budget Justifications; funding
for FY1998-FY2000 includes San Diego fencing as well as fencing, light, and road projects in El
Centro, Tucson, El Paso, and Marfa.  FY2001 and FY2002 construction funding identified from the
FY2002 INS Congressional Budget Justifications.  FY2000 construction funding identified from the
FY2001 INS Congressional Budget Justifications and H.Rept. 107-278.  FY1999 construction funding
identified from P.L. 105-277.  FY1998 construction funding identified from P.L. 105-119. FY1997
funding identified from P.L. 104-208.  FY1996 construction funding identified from P.L. 104-134.
Note:  In FY2003 immigration inspections from the former INS, Customs inspections from the former
customs service, and the USBP were merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
within DHS.  As a result of this the data for years prior to FY2003 may not be comparable with the
data for FY2004 and after.
Under the current MOA, once CBP purchases the materials and acquires the
land, the Corps of Engineers undertakes the engineering studies and provides the
manpower and machinery that are used to install the fencing.  The actual manpower
is typically provided by the State National Guard (the California National Guard, for
example, constructed much of the San Diego fence), although occasionally the
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35 From interviews with CBP, November 30, 2005 and September 13, 2006, and the Corps
of Engineers, November 29, 2005. 
36 Bollard fencing is comprised of vertical installations of solid concrete, metal spheres, or
large posts, embedded into the ground at small enough intervals as to be impassable. Bollard
fencing is difficult to compromise but expensive to install.  See Appendix I for a depiction
(continued...)
military, and sometimes the USBP, are involved in the construction.35  The Corps of
Engineers funding comes from the Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and
Counter-Drug Activities Account.  Table 2 shows the funding for the “Southwest
Border Fence” sub-account within this DOD Account, from FY1997 to FY2006. 
Table 2.  DOD Funding for the Southwest Border Fence
(millions of dollars)











Source: FY2006, H.Rept. 109-359; FY2005, H.Rept. 108-622; FY2004, H.Rept. 108-283; FY2004,
H.Rept. 107-732; FY2002, H.Rept. 107-333; FY2002, H.Rept. 106-945; FY2000, H.Rept. 106-371,
FY1999, H.Rept. 105-746; FY1998, H.Rept. 105-265; FY1997, H.Rept. 104-724.  
Notes: FY2005 funding for the “Southwest Border Fence” sub-account was not identified in the
Conference Report, H.Rept. 108-622.  The House Committee had recommended $7 million for this
sub-account in H.Rept. 108-553; while the Senate Committee had not recommended any funding for
it in S.Rept. 108-284.  
Types of Fences and Barriers
The USBP currently uses three main types of barriers along the border: primary
fencing immediately on the international border, Sandia fencing behind the primary
fencing, and vehicle barriers meant to stop vehicles, but not people on foot, from
traversing the border.  While other forms of primary fencing, such as bollard




37 Picket fencing is comprised of metal stakes set sufficiently close together as to be
impassable.  See Appendix I for a depiction of picket fencing.
38 Roughly 13 miles of these alternate forms of fencing have been constructed to date,
according to an interview with CBP Congressional Affairs on September 13, 2006.
39 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Construction Engineering Research Laboratories,
Engineering Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Study of Barrier Fencing Systems, USACERL
Technical Report 99/28, February 1999, p. 14.  Hereafter referred to as Corps of Engineers
Study.  
40 Interview with CBP Congressional Affairs, September 13, 2006.
41 Telephone conversation with CBP, November 30, 2005.
42 Interview with CBP Congressional Affairs, December 23, 2005.
43 The Corps of Engineers used 1997 dollars in their study.  For the purposes of this
memorandum, the numbers predicted by the Corps have been adjusted to 2005 dollars using
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator available at
[http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html].  The actual predictions made by the
Corps, in 1997 dollars, were $341,584 to $379,538 per mile for construction costs, and
$1,534 to $15,629 per year in maintenance costs.
agency has largely focused on using the landing mat fencing as a primary fence and
the Sandia fence as a secondary fence. 
Landing Mat Fencing.   Landing mat fencing is composed of army surplus
carbon steel landing mats which were used to create landing strips during the
Vietnam War.  The landing mats form panels 12 feet long, 20 inches wide, and 1/4
inch thick, which are welded to steel pipes buried 8 feet deep every 6 feet along the
fence.  Each mile of fencing requires the use of 3,080 panels.39  There are about 5
miles of surplus landing mat fencing remaining as of 2006.40  According to the
USBP, sites that feature landing mat fencing include the following USBP stations:
Campo, CA; Yuma, AZ; Nogales, AZ; Naco, AZ; Douglas, AZ, and El Paso, TX.41
There are 62 miles of landing mat fencing currently constructed.42
In a 1999 study, the Corps of Engineers predicted that construction costs for the
landing mat fencing would range from $388,005 to $431,117 per mile.43  This
estimate includes the cost of materials, despite the fact that the landing mat fencing
constructed to date has been comprised of army-surplus panels acquired by CBP at
no cost.  As previously noted, however, only about 5 miles of surplus landing mat
fencing material remains available.  Maintenance costs per year could vary widely
depending on the number of breaches the fence undergoes.  Low levels of damage to
the fence would result in low annual repair costs, while a large number of breaches
could result in stretches of fencing needing to be replaced.  Per mile, the Corps of
Engineers estimated that yearly maintenance costs would probably range from $1,742
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44 Corps of Engineers Study, p. 21.
45 Net present value is a term used by the Corps of Engineers in their life cycle costs
analyses for construction projects.  It amortizes the future costs of a project and shows what
the entire costs of the project will be.  In this case, these numbers represent 25 year
predictions and have been adjusted from 1997 dollars to 2005 dollars using a GDP Deflator
46 DHS published a Federal Register notice on September 22, 2005, declaring the waiver of,
in their entirety: (1) the National Environmental Protection Act  (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.);
(2) the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.); (3) the Coastal Zone Management
Act (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.); (4) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. §§1251
et seq.); (5) the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §§470 et seq.); (6) the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. §§703 et seq.); (7) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
§§7401 et seq.); and (8) the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.).
47 Telephone conversation with CBP, November 30, 2005.
48 DHS FY2007 Justifications. pg. CBP Construction 18.
to $17,753.44  The Corps of Engineers noted that the net present value45 of the fence
after 25 years of operation, per mile, would range from $5.4 million and $8.3 million
a mile depending on the amount of damage sustained by the fencing each year.  
Sandia Secondary Fence.  The secondary fence proposed by the Sandia
study has only been constructed over roughly 9.5 miles of the 14 miles in the original
plan due to environmental concerns voiced by the California Coastal Commission.
As previously discussed, P.L. 109-13 included language that will allow waiver of all
legal requirements determined necessary by the Secretary of DHS for the expeditious
construction of authorized barriers and only allows judicial review for constitutional
claims.  On September 14, 2005, DHS announced it is applying its new waiver
authority to complete the San Diego fence.46  However, construction has not begun
on the remaining four miles of the San Diego fence because DHS is in the process
of acquiring the necessary land.47  DHS is currently estimating that it will cost an
additional $66 million to finish the San Diego fence, bringing overall costs for this
14 mile-long project to $127 million.  Additionally, DHS notes that it will use a mix
of DOD resources and private contractors to finish the fence, and that the cost of
using contractors is included in the request.48
The Sandia fence, as it has been constructed in the San Diego sector, is a
secondary fence constructed behind the primary fence.  Enough space is left between
the two fences to accommodate an access road.  The secondary fence is an angled
two-piece fence.  The fence is vertical up to ten feet high, and then extends out at an
angle towards the climber.  This  prevents climbing by using gravity and the weight
of the climber against them.  The Corps of Engineers estimated that Sandia fencing
costs per mile would range from $785,679 to $872,977 for construction and $953 to
$7,628 per mile yearly for maintenance.  Additionally, the Corps of Engineers study
notes that the Sandia fence would possibly need to be replaced in the fifth year of
operation and in every fourth year thereafter if man-made damage to the fence was
“severe and ongoing.”  For this reason, in the study the Corps of Engineers noted that
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49 The numbers used by the Corps of Engineers were cited in 1997 dollars.  They have been
adjusted to 2005 dollars using the GDP deflator cited above.  The actual costs per mile in
the Corps of Engineers Study were:  $691,680 to $768,533 for construction, and $839 to
$6,715 for maintenance.   Net Present Value after 25 years in 1997 dollars ranged from
$9.73 million to $54.23 million.  Corps of Engineer Study, p. 3 and p. 23.
50 Jonathan Athens, “Officials say OK to Border Fence,” YumaSun.com (July 20, 2005)
available at [http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive14980.html].
51 DHS FY2007 Justifications, pg. CBP Construction-7.  CBP project length does not
include the 30 miles of vehicle barriers maintained by the National Park Service.
52 DHS FY2007 Justifications, pg. CBP Construction-18.  It is unclear why the project is
predicted to take less time with contractors, and yet the overall completion date for the
construction is predicted to be 2011.
the net present value of the fence after 25 years of operation, per mile, would range
from $11.1 million to $61.6 million.49
Other Border Barriers: Vehicle Barriers
The USBP utilizes various different types of barriers to impede vehicles from
crossing into the United States from Mexico.  Some of these barriers are temporary
and can be moved to different locations when needed, others are permanent barriers.
The main purpose of vehicle barriers is to prevent smugglers from easily driving their
vehicles across the border.
 
Permanent Vehicle Barriers.  Permanent vehicle barriers, as their name
suggests, are not designed to be moved but rather are permanent installations.
Permanent vehicle barriers are typically steel posts, or bollards, that are excavated 5
feet deep and inserted into a poured concrete base.  The posts alternate in above-
ground height in order to dissuade individuals from forming a ramp over the barrier.
They are spaced so as to allow foot and animal traffic but not vehicular traffic.  The
USBP recently began building permanent vehicle barriers in the Yuma sector, with
a substantial stretch slated to be built along the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument.    When linked with the 30 miles of vehicle barriers built by the National
Park Service, a USBP spokesman reportedly noted that the total 123 mile length of
the project “will form the largest continuous physical barrier along the border in the
nation.”50 
In the FY2007 DHS Congressional Budget Justifications, DHS notes that the
Yuma vehicle barrier project would take until at least 2010 (and possibly longer) to
complete if CBP continued to use  the Corps of Engineers and other military
personnel to construct the barriers.  Instead, CBP proposes hiring commercial
contractors to build 39 miles of vehicle barriers in the Yuma sector, or almost half
of the project’s 93 mile total.51  CBP is projecting that the project will be completed
by FY2011, and that the overall project costs will be $116 million.52  This means that,
overall, the project will cost roughly $1.25 million per mile.  The National Park
Service has spent $11.1 million to construct 18 miles of permanent vehicle barriers
in Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, and has obligated, but not yet spent, an
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53 From the National Park Service, February 9, 2006.  The National Park Service notes that
30 miles of permanent vehicle barriers are being built at the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, and one mile is being built in the Coronado National Monument.
54 Email correspondence with CBP Congressional affairs, December 23, 2005.  
55 Telephone conversation with CBP, November 30, 2005.
56 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Final Environmental
Assessment U.S. Border Patrol Temporary Vehicle Barriers Naco and Douglas, Arizona,
November 2002.  
additional $6.6 million in FY2005 funding to complete the remaining 13 miles of the
project.53
DHS currently has roughly 50 miles of vehicle barriers deployed along the
border.54  Vehicle barriers have been used in the El Centro, CA, Yuma, AZ, Tucson,
AZ, and El Paso, TX sectors.55
Temporary Vehicle Barriers. Temporary vehicle barriers are typically built
from welded metal, such as railroad track, but can also be constructed from telephone
poles or pipe.  These barriers are built so that they cannot be rolled or moved
manually; they can only be moved with a forklift or a front-end loader.  They are
usually built at USBP stations and transported to areas of high vehicle entry, where
they are placed and chained together.56  The main advantage of the temporary vehicle
barriers is their ability to be redeployed to different areas to address changes in
smuggling patterns.  The main disadvantage of these barriers is that they are easier
to compromise than permanent vehicle barriers.  
Legislation in the 109th Congress
There are a number of bills in the 109th Congress that would expand the current
fencing and other forms of barriers at the international land border.  Some of these
bills would require fencing to be constructed along the entire southwest border,
others would identify particular stretches of land which would receive fencing, and
still others would call for studies to determine whether fencing is a cost-effective way
of securing the border.  The REAL-ID Act (P.L. 109-13) expanded DHS’ waiver
authority in order to expedite the construction of border fencing.  Subsequently, H.R.
4437 and H.R. 6061, which would direct DHS to construct roughly 849 miles of
fencing along the border, were passed by the House on December 16, 2005 and
September 14, 2006 respectively.  S. 2611, which calls for 370 miles of fencing to
be constructed, was passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006.  Senate Amendment 4788
was added to the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, H.R. 5631, on August
2, 2006, and would appropriate $1.8 billion to the National Guard for the
construction of border fencing.  H.R. 5631 was passed by the Senate on September
7, 2006 and is currently in Conference. Following is a brief discussion of the border
barrier related legislation in the 109th Congress.
H.R. 4083 would amend the INA to direct the Secretary to construct a fence
along the entire southwest border and would authorize $2 billion for this purpose.
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between each of the locations outlined in the provision.  Given the fact that the border is not
a straight line, the actual length of the fencing that would be required by this provision may
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S. 1916 includes a provision requiring the Secretary to study the feasibility and cost
of constructing a triple fence along the southwest border.  S. 2049 would direct the
Secretary to construct whatever fencing and other infrastructure is necessary to
achieve operational control of the border.  H.R. 4313, S. 2061, S. 2117, S. 2368, and
S. 2377 would direct the Secretary to construct a two layered reinforced fence along
the southern international land border, starting with high alien traffic and smuggling
areas.  H.R. 4313, S. 2117, S.2368, and S. 2377 would also direct the Secretary to
create a border zone within 100 yards of the land border and would require other
agencies to transfer any land in their jurisdiction that falls inside the border zone to
DHS without reimbursement.  Additionally, H.R. 4313 and S. 2117 would direct the
Secretary to undertake a review and value assessment of all property in the border
zone owned by private parties and state and local governments, and to begin
acquiring this property as soon as practicable.
H.R. 4437, as amended, would direct DHS to construct two layered reinforced
fencing and additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras and sensors along
roughly 730 miles57 of the southern border, including 20 miles around Tecate, CA;
from Calexico, CA to Douglas, AZ;  from Columbus, NM to El Paso, TX; from Del
Rio, TX to Eagle Pass, TX; and from Laredo, TX to Brownsville, TX.  The bill
would designate the roughly 370 mile portion of the fence between Calexico, CA and
Douglas, AZ a priority area and would direct DHS to ensure that “an interlocking
surveillance camera system” is installed along this area by May 30, 2006, and that the
fence is completed by May 30, 2007.  The bill would also designate a 30 mile stretch
around Laredo, TX as a priority area and would direct DHS to complete this fencing
by December 31, 2006.  H.R. 6061 includes a similar provision but would push back
the construction deadlines for the priority areas by one year for the Calexico, CA to
Douglas, AZ stretch of fencing and by two years for the 30 mile stretch around
Laredo, TX.
S. 2611, as amended, S. 2454, S. 2612, and S. 3564 would replace the current
border fencing in the Tucson sector with a reinforced double layer fence and would
direct DHS to construct 150 miles of vehicle barriers in the sector. S. 2454 would
require that fencing be extended 25 miles west of Naco, AZ; S. 2611, S. 2612, and
S. 3564 would require that fencing be extended at least 10 miles west of Naco.  Each
of the bills would also expand the fencing in the Yuma sector, would require that the
double or triple layer fence constructed be extended at least two miles beyond urban
areas, and would add 50 miles of vehicle barriers to the sector.  The bills would direct
DHS, in conjunction with other federal agencies, to submit a study on the
construction of a system of barriers along the southern and northern borders,
including information on the need for such a system, the costs associated with
constructing the system, the system’s potential environmental impacts, and the
system’s potential impact on trade or tourism.  S. 2394 would direct DHS to initiate
a process for planning, constructing, and maintaining a permanent barrier or wall
along appropriate areas of the border. 
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58 For the views of supporters of border fencing, refer to “We Need a Fence,” available at
[http://www.weneedafence.com/], last visited September 21, 2006, and Thomas Sowell,
“Let’s Get Our Terms Straight,” available at
[http://www.annistonstar.com/opinion/2006/as-insight-0402-0-6d01s3130.htm], last visited
September 21, 2006.
59 For the views of opponents of border fencing, refer to Eilene Zimmerman, “Against the
Wall,” Salon, December 12, 2005, available at
[http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/12/12/border_wall/index.html], last visited
September 21, 2006, and Molly Ivins, “Another Brick in the Wall,” available at
[http://www.annistonstar.com/opinion/2006/as-insight-0402-0-6d01s3130.htm] last visited
September 21, 2006.
S. 2611, as amended, and S. 3564 would further direct DHS to construct 370
miles of triple-layered fencing and 500 miles of vehicle barriers in areas along the
southwest border most often used by smugglers or illegal aliens to enter the United
States within two years of enactment.  The Senate-passed Defense Appropriations
Bill for FY2007 (H.R. 5631), as amended by S.Amdt. 4788, would appropriate
$1,829 million for the National Guard to construct 370 miles of triple-layered fencing
and 500 miles of vehicle barriers along the southwest border.
  H.R. 4437 and H.R. 4312 would require DHS to reimburse property owners
for the costs incurred in repairing private infrastructure along the border damaged by
aliens entering the country illegally.  The bills would authorize appropriations of
$50,000 a year for this program. 
Issues For Congress
There are a number of policy issues that Congress may consider concerning the
construction of barriers along the border, including, but not limited to: their
effectiveness; their overall costs compared with their benefits; their possible
diplomatic ramifications; their unintended consequences; and the locations in which
they are to be constructed.  Although these issues apply to all potential barriers at the
border, due to the focus on border fencing in the current congressional debate this
section will focus its analysis on the potential policy issues surrounding the
construction of fencing at the border.
  
Effectiveness.   Proponents of border fences point to the substantial reduction
in apprehensions along the San Diego sector as tangible proof that fences succeed in
reducing cross-border smuggling and migration where they are constructed.58
Opponents attribute part of the decrease in apprehensions to the increase in
manpower and resources in the sector and, pointing to the increase in apprehensions
in less-populated sectors, contend that the fence only succeeds in re-routing
unauthorized migration and not in stopping it.59  The USBP, for its part, states that
border fencing is a force multiplier because it allows its agents to focus enforcement
actions in other areas.  The USBP has also stated that the fencing constructed in
urban areas has helped reroute unauthorized migration to less populated areas where
its agents have a tactical advantage over border crossers.  As previously noted, the
number of USBP apprehensions in 2004 were almost identical to the number of
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Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, May 16, 2006. P. 34.  Available at 
[http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7208/s2611.pdf], last visited August 2, 2006.
apprehensions in 1992; the main difference is that while San Diego accounted for the
majority of apprehensions in 1992, in 2004 Tucson and Yuma sectors accounted for
the majority of apprehensions. 
A possible issue for Congress concerns the overall effectiveness of border
fencing, especially if it is not constructed across the entire border in question.  In the
limited urban areas where border fencing has been constructed, it has typically
reduced apprehensions.  However, there is also strong indication that the fencing,
combined with added enforcement, has re-routed illegal immigrants to other less
fortified areas of the border.  Additionally, in the limited areas where fencing has
been erected there have been numerous breaches of the border fencing and a number
of tunnels discovered crossing underneath the fencing.  It stands to reason that even
if border fencing is constructed over a significant portion of the land border, the
incidences of fence breaches and underground tunnels would increase.  Possible
policy options to address these issues could include mandating that border fencing
be highly tamper-resistant or directing CBP to invest in tunnel-detection
technologies.
Costs.  Because border fencing is a relatively new and limited phenomenon
along the U.S.-Mexico border, there is a dearth of information concerning its overall
costs and benefits.  The Corps of Engineers study predicted that the costs of
constructing a double layer fence consisting of primary fencing and Sandia fencing
would range from $1.2 million to $1.3 million a mile.  The Corps of Engineers also
predicted that the 25 year life cycle cost of the fence would range from $16.4 million
to $70 million per mile depending on the amount of damage sustained by the fencing.
If significant portions of the border were to be fenced, reducing the areas along which
individuals could cross the border, it may stand to reason that the fencing will be
subjected to more breaches and other attempts to compromise than the fencing that
has already been constructed.  This may mean that the costs of maintaining border
fencing that is widely deployed in the future will be higher than they have been thus
far for the limited deployment.  The Corps estimates do not include the costs of
acquiring the land or most labor costs, since construction would be done by DOD;
these could well turn out to be significant expenses. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) has estimated that border fencing would cost $3 million a mile to
construct.60  However, the CBO does not elaborate on what is included in that
estimate.  DHS predicts that the San Diego fence will have a total cost of $127
million for its 14 mile length when it is completed — roughly $9 million a mile.
However this cost may be somewhat misleading due to the following factors:
construction of the fence was delayed for an extended period of time; the remaining
construction involves filling a relatively large gulch which may be more complex
than the average stretch of border; and DHS is proposing to use private contractors
to expedite the construction process which will increase the labor costs and thus the
project costs. 
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sector, for example, agents patrolling along the fence are deployed in armored vehicles
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Some have argued that building fences on the border is too expensive and would
consume funding that would be better spent on hiring additional agents or deploying
additional technologies to the border.61  Others maintain that the costs of fencing are
negligible compared to the costs of illegal immigration, and that fencing has been
proven effective at decreasing illegal immigration in those areas where it has been
deployed.62  The USBP has testified that “for border control, for border security, we
need that appropriate mix. It’s not about fences. It’s not about Border Patrol agents.
It’s not about technology. It’s about all of those things.”63  At issue for Congress is
how best to allocate scarce border security resources while safeguarding homeland
security.  Does border fencing represent the best investment of border security
funding, and what is the appropriate mix of border security resources?  How much
will maintaining border fencing cost in the future, and which agency will be
responsible for this maintenance?  Will using private contractors to expedite the
construction of border fencing increase the costs?  
Fence Design.  Congress mandated the design of the border fence in San
Diego in IIRIRA.  Many of the bills being considered in the 109th Congress that
include fencing provisions also identify the kind of fencing — typically double or
triple fencing — that should be constructed.  There are many different fence designs
that could be deployed to the border, and each have their relative strengths and
weaknesses.  Concrete panels, for example, are among the more cost-effective
solutions but USBP agents cannot see through this type of fencing; the USBP has
testified about their preference for fencing that can be seen through, so as to identify
the activity occurring on the Mexican side of the border and thus preserve their
tactical advantage over potential border crossers, and to better avoid potential
rockings64 or other violent incidents.  Sandia fencing has been effective in San Diego
and can be seen through, but is among the more expensive fencing options.  Bollard
fencing has been effective in its limited deployment and can also be seen through, but
is also expensive to install and to maintain.  Chain link fencing is relatively
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economical, but more easily compromised.65 If fencing is to be constructed along the
border, an issue concerns what kinds of fencing should be constructed in order to
maximize its deterrent effect and its utility to the USBP while minimizing the costs
associated with its construction and maintenance. 
Fence Location.  The USBP has testified that border fencing is most effective
for its operational purposes when deployed along urban areas.66  In these areas,
individuals crossing the border have a short distance to cover before disappearing
into neighborhoods; once they have entered neighborhoods it is much more difficult
for USBP agents to identify and apprehend unauthorized aliens.  Additionally, from
populated areas it is relatively easy for unauthorized aliens to find transportation into
the interior.  For these reasons, all of the border fencing constructed by the USBP to
date has been built in urban areas abutting the border, such as San Diego, Nogales,
and El Paso.  In rural areas, the USBP has testified that it has a tactical advantage
over border crossers because they must travel longer distances before reaching
populated areas.  According to CBP, fencing is manpower intensive because agents
must continually check the fence for breaches and for illegal activity. This does not
represent a problem in urban areas, because the USBP stations are typically located
near the border in those areas.  In some of the more rural areas of the border, where
the nearest towns and USBP stations may be many miles away from the border, this
would mean that agents would need to spend much of their working day commuting
from the nearest USBP station to the fence location.67  Additionally, because the
border fencing constructed to date has been built along urban areas it has been
relatively easy to house the individuals involved in its construction.  If border fencing
is extended into the more remote areas of the border, the costs of its construction may
increase due to the need to bring the individuals and goods needed to build the fence
to these areas for extended periods of time.
A very practical issue concerns what areas of the border should be fenced.
Should fencing be restricted to urban or semi-urban areas in order to give the USBP
a tactical advantage over border crossers, or should fencing be constructed along any
geographical area of the border that features large numbers of unauthorized
immigration?  In rural areas, should fencing be limited to areas of high illegal entry
in order to impede individuals from crossing the border, or should fencing be
constructed as a deterrent in any area, even those featuring low levels of illegal entry?
Should fencing be deployed in sectors where the distance between the nearest USBP
station and the fence requires agents to spend most of their day commuting?  Should
fencing be deployed to the northern border as well as the southwest border?  Will
building fencing along more remote areas of the border increase the construction
costs?
Land Acquisition.  There are a number of issues associated with the
acquisition of the land that would be required for border fencing.  Much of the land
along the California and Arizona border is owned by the federal government;
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however most of the land along the Texas border is owned by private individuals.
What will the costs of acquiring the land to construct border fencing be, and have
these costs been factored into estimates of border fencing costs?  Will eminent
domain be used to confiscate land from individuals who do not wish to have fencing
built on their lands? 
A corollary issue may involve DHS’ authority to construct border fencing along
tribal lands.  The Arizona desert along the Tohono O’odham reservation has become
one of the most heavily trafficked border areas in the country, and the USBP has been
restricted in its operations in the reservation due to tribal concerns.68  The Tohono
O’odham have reportedly vowed to fight the construction of fencing on tribe-owned
land, citing environmental and cultural concerns.69  Whether the expanded waiver
authority that was given to the Secretary of DHS by the REAL-ID Act would allow
the Department to override the jurisdiction of tribal governments along the border
remains an open question.
Diplomatic Ramifications.  The governments of Mexico and Canada have
both voiced concern about the United States constructing barriers along the
international border.  Mexican President Vicente Fox has come out strongly against
the construction of border barriers on numerous occasions, stating his belief that
these projects isolate the two nations, create frustration and misunderstandings, and
do not solve the underlying problems that lead individuals to enter the United States
illegally.  Mexican Press Secretary Rubén Aguilar Valenzuela stated his
government’s belief that “history has also taught us that a wall is never the solution
to problems and that all walls eventually get torn down.”70  The Mexican government
has reportedly forwarded numerous diplomatic notes to the White House registering
its complaints against the possible expansion of border fencing.  The Canadian
government has also reportedly voiced concern over language that was inserted into
H.R. 4437 that would require a study of fencing options along the northern border,
citing the impracticality of fencing the northen border and the fact that the U.S.
government has never discussed such a plan with Canadian authorities.71  Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement John P. Clark
reportedly stated during Congressional testimony that the proposed expansion of
border fencing “harkens back to the Chinese wall and the Berlin Wall, not the
CRS-26
72 Eunice Moscoso, “Border Fence Would Cost Millions, Not Work Critics Say,” Cox News
Service, November 9, 2005.
message we want to send to the Mexican government, the Canadian government, and
the rest of the world.”72  There are a number of  possible issues for Congress to
consider involving the potential diplomatic ramifications of constructing barriers
along the border: Do the gains in border security outweigh the risk of alienating
Mexico and Canada?  Should the Mexican or Canadian government’s opinions or
wishes be taken into account when border fencing is concerned?  Given the need to
coordinate intelligence and law enforcement activities at the border, should
maintaining cordial working relationships with Mexico and Canada take precedence
over sealing the border with physical barriers?
Unintended Consequences.  There is considerable evidence that the
USBP’s historical strategy of “Prevention through Deterrence,” whereby agents and
resources including border fencing and other barriers have been concentrated along
urban areas and areas traditionally featuring high levels of illegal entry, has
succeeded in changing the flow of illegal migration.  While San Diego and El Paso
were historically the two sectors that featured the most apprehensions and the highest
levels of illegal immigration, since the mid-1990s and the advent of Operations
Gatekeeper and Hold the Line in those sectors, the more remote geographical areas
of the Arizona border have become the hot-spots for illegal migration into the United
States.  One unintended consequence of this enforcement posture and the shift in
migration patterns has been an increase in the number of migrant deaths each year;
on average 200 migrants died each year in the early 1990s,  compared with 472
migrant deaths in 2005.   Another unintended consequence of this enforcement
posture may have been a relative increase, compared to the national average, in crime
along the border in these more-remote regions.  While crime rates in San Diego, CA
and El Paso, TX, have declined over the past fifteen years, the reduction in crime
rates along the more rural areas of the border have lagged behind the national trends.
Another unintended consequence of the border fencing has been the proliferation of
tunnels dug underneath the border.  In San Diego, where the double-layer Sandia
fencing has been constructed, smugglers have dug a number of tunnels underneath
the border fence.  One of these tunnels was almost a kilometer long and was built
from reinforced concrete — evidence of a rather sophisticated smuggling operation.
A possible issue for Congress to consider as it debates expanding the existing
border fencing concerns what the unintended consequences of this expansion could
be.  Given the re-routing of migration flows that have already occurred, are DHS and
the relevant border communities prepared to handle the increased flow of illegal
migration to non-reinforced areas?  Is DHS prepared to deal with an increase in the
phenomenon of cross-border tunnels and other attempts to defeat the purpose of the
fencing?  What will the impact on crime rates be along the unreinforced areas of the
border?  Will USBP agents be required to spend some of their patrolling time
guarding the fence?
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Appendix I: Examples of USBP Border Fencing
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Environmental
Assessment for Infrastructure Within U.S. Border Patrol Naco-Douglas Corridor Cochise County,
Arizona, August, 2000, p. 1-13.
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Appendix II: The San Diego Fence
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Environmental Impact Statement for
the Completion of the 14-Mile Border Infrastructure System San Diego, California, July
2003.
CRS-29
Appendix III: Permanent Vehicle Barrier Schematic
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Proposed Vehicle Barrier
Environmental Assessment, April, 2003.  
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Appendix IV: Permanent Vehicle Barriers
Source: CBP Congressional Affairs.
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Appendix V: Data From Figure 4
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004
Other San Diego
Sector Stations
204,456 210,129 155,386 262,505 297,423 189,321 160,781 140,640 113,866 85,815 87,195 96,752 119,293
Chula Vista
Station
158,952 156,273 107,872 141,096 111,413 67,804 72,648 27,085 19,453 9,627 3,080 4,545 9,923
Imperial Beach
Station
202,173 165,287 186,894 120,630 74,979 27,865 15,832 15,974 19,815 15,480 11,405 10,218 9,112
Tucson 71,036 92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406 470,449 616,346 449,675 333,648 347,263 490,827
Source: CRS Presentation of CBP data
